Nuke Transportation Story Has Explosive Implications
By Robert Stormer

Last month, six W80-1 nuclear-armed AGM-129 advanced cruise missiles were flown from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and sat on the tarmac for 10 hours undetected.

Press reports initially cited the Air Force mistake of flying nuclear weapons over the United States in violation of Air Force standing orders and international treaties, while completely missing the more important major issues, such as how six nuclear cruise missiles got loose to begin with.

Opinion columns and editorials appeared in America's newspapers, some blasting the Air Force for flying nukes over the U.S. and some defending the Air Force procedure. None of the news reports focused on the real questions of our nuclear security.

Let me be very clear here: We are not talking about paintball cartridges or pellet gun ammo. We are talking nuclear weapons.

There is a strict chain of custody for all such weapons. Nuclear weapons handling is spelled out in great detail in Air Force regulations, to the credit of that service. Every person who orders the movement of these weapons, handles them, breaks seals or moves any nuclear weapon must sign off for tracking purposes.

Two armed munitions specialists are required to work as a team with all nuclear weapons. All individuals working with nuclear weapons must meet very strict security standards and be tested for loyalty -- this is known as a "Personnel Reliability Program." They work in restricted areas within eyeshot of one another and are reviewed constantly.

All security forces assigned are authorized to use deadly force to protect the weapons from any threat. Nor does anyone quickly move a 1-ton cruise missile -- or forget about six of them, as reported by some news outlets, especially cruise missiles loaded with high explosives.

The United States also does not transport nuclear weapons meant for elimination attached to their launch vehicles under the wings of a combat aircraft. The procedure is to separate the warhead from the missile, encase the warhead and transport it by military cargo aircraft to a repository -- not an operational bomber base that just happens to be the staging area for Middle Eastern operations.

Yes, we still do fly nuclear warheads over the United States today. We also drive them over land as well. That's not the point.

This is about how six nuclear advanced cruise missiles got out of their bunkers and onto a combat aircraft without notice of the wing commander, squadron commander, munitions maintenance squadron (MMS), the B-52H's crew chief and command pilot and onto another Air Force base tarmac without notice of that air base's chain of command -- for 10 hours.

It is time that we got to the bottom of it through a comprehensive investigation.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has asked Larry Welch, a former Air Force chief of staff, to lead an independent inquiry into the implications of the incident. That is in addition to the existing Air Force investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of air and space operations at Air Combat Command, which is responsible for all Air Force bombers and fighters.

The questions that must be answered:

1. Why, and for what ostensible purpose, were these nuclear weapons taken to Barksdale?

2. How long was it before the error was discovered?

3. How many mistakes and errors were made, and how many needed to be made, for this to happen?

4. How many and which security protocols were overlooked?

5. How many and which safety procedures were bypassed or ignored?

6. How many other nuclear command and control non-observations of procedure have there been?

7. What is Congress going to do to better oversee U.S. nuclear command and control?

8. How does this incident relate to concern for reliability of control over nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in Russia, Pakistan and elsewhere?

9. Does the Bush administration, as some news reports suggest, have plans to attack Iran with nuclear weapons?

10. If this was an accident, have we degraded our military to a point where we are now making critical mistakes with our nuclear arsenal? If so, how do we correct this?

Yes, heads must roll and careers will end. But let's make sure that this includes the ranks from general officers to noncommissioned ones.

Or is this to be the Air Force version of the Abu Ghraib investigation? [Star-Telegram Oct 7/07]

 William Thomas, author of “Command Override” article, replies:

1. The chances of six nuclear missiles being "accidentally" removed from a secure U.S. air base bunker requiring multiple, high-ranking oversight and redundant verifications at every step is... zero.

2. The only two living persons in the U.S. command structure able to give a nuclear launch order are the National Command Authority (NCA) comprising the President and Secretary of Defense. Bush, by all accounts, did not know the Minot missiles had flown until after the B-52 had landed at Barksdale. Gates has called for a military "drawdown" in Iraq and cautioned against attacking Iran - so it is extremely unlikely he gave such an order. High-level (JCS) military officers could order nuclear missiles flown around the country. But U.S. Air Force commanders do not have the NCA launch codes necessary to send a bomber on a nuclear strike mission.

3. In the case of a national emergency such as 9/11, if the NCA absents themselves and cannot be contacted, Cheney can and did issue the crucial (treasonous) order not to destroy incoming Flight 77 before it struck the Pentagon. But there was no such emergency on the day of the Minot operation - indeed, the base itself was stood down for "Family Day" and the U.S. military worldwide remained at a relaxed DefCon posture. An intentional attack on another nation without placing combat forces on alert violates all U.S. warfighting doctrines.

4. Only the National Command Authority - or hackers in possession of their codes - can recall a nuclear strike. "Mutinying" air force officers could force a recall by threatening to expose the plot - if such a plot existed. But again, it appears that the NCA was unaware of this mission.

5. Barskdale AFB does not store nuclear cruise missiles. If a cabal within the U.S. government and military wanted to launch a nuclear strike against Iran, for example, using this main USAF operational staging base for Mideast operations, they would first have to transfer those missiles to Barksdale. Truck or rail is the preferred method for transcontinental nuclear weapons transport. As Lt. Cmdr. Stormer asks, what was the rush to get nuclear weapons to Barksdale? Especially, when that base has no facilities to properly store and maintain them. One answer is that the six ACMs were never intended to be diverted to Barksdale. They were heading for Iran.

6. According to sources at Barksdale, all six cruise missiles landed there and are accounted for. Because they emit radiation, cruise missile warheads - and "suitcase nukes" - can be tracked using satellites and aerial surveillance. NYC has such sentries in place, and I am sure other major U.S. cities constantly monitor for nuclear material, as well. Still, a White House -facilitated "false flag" nuclear attack on a sacrificial U.S. city cannot be ruled out. Mass murder does not faze these fundamentalists: the death toll of Iraqi families since 1991 is over two-million corpses (UN figures) - and rising.

7. The "cluster of violent deaths" at Minot and Barksdale following this incident strongly point to (but do not prove) a drastic silencing of key personnel, who could not be trusted to remain silent about what they knew concerning an incident falsely classified as a "Bent Spear" accident.

8. Instead of serving as a rubber stamp for a self-proclaimed "dictator" installed and reconfirmed by Republican-run voting machines in a computerized coup, Congress should be immediately dissolved and disbanded. This would expose the true form of government that currently rules the United States, a system correctly identified by Benito Mussolini as corporate fascism. (Think: "Executive Orders," "Halliburton" and "Bechtel".)

9. The suggestion that Chinese People's Liberation Army hackers somehow broke the constantly-changing set of nuclear movement and strike codes, and issued those commands remotely in the name of the NCA is wild, outrageous - and plausible. Corroborated by two separate "inside" sources unaware of each other, this story gains further credence when viewed in light of recent, publicly acknowledged PLA computer attacks on the SecDef's supposedly "Secure" Pentagon computer network - necessitating an emergency shutdown.

Chinese generals have stated publicly that cyber warfare is a national military priority more powerful than nuclear war. The immediate establishment of a "Cyber Warfare Command" at Barksdale within weeks of the nuclear incident to counter the Chinese cyber threat shows Beijing's cyber capabilities are real.

Bad enough that the U.S. government and military lost control of six, fully armed nuclear weapons for five hours last August. Consider the national security implications - and worldwide uproar - if it becomes known that a foreign power had overriden Washington's most carefully guarded nuclear war protocols. This could be done by installing "back doors" into U.S. civilian and military microchips at their place of manufacture - not within the United States, Japan or Taiwan as "mil spec" contracts stipulate - but, as we now know, in mainland China at plants overseen by "minders" from the Chinese Government. Following publication of my "Faulty Chips" revelations, the Joint Chiefs of staff carried out an internal investigation and (I am told by a trusted source with high-level Pentagon access) verified my account as correct.

10. What really happened? Lt. Cmdr. Stormer is correct: The people of the United States - and every creature on planet Earth - require a full, impartial, and publicly-accountable investigation of this incident now. We also need to commence complete nuclear disarmament immediately. Otherwise, somewhere, someday - and probably soon - one or more of these hideous weapons will be used. And then we will all inhabit a very different world indeed.

William Thomas USNR (resigned)

PHOTO CREDITS
B-52 Stratofortress www.sfahistory.org
B-52 command pilot www.spectator.co.nz

  AIR FORCE OFFICERS FACE DISCIPLINE OVER "BENT SPEAR"

CNN's Lou Dobbs reports that as many as six air force officers are facing "harsh disciplinary action" over the nuclear B-52 incident.

As CNN analyst Brigadier General David Grange (ret.) noted on-air, "There's a quite a lot of security in these systems, there's duplicaiton, it takes more than one person to make a mistake, very unusual." [CNN Oct 18/07]

William Thomas comments:
"Very unusual" indeeed! Why can't CNN ask the obvious question:

How did as many as six professional air force officers - highly trained and constantly drilled to check each other in a ?real world? nuclear weapons load-out involving an unprecidented six atomic weapons - all screw up their mandatory and redundant verification procedures?

Unless all six were involved in a wider conspiracy involving the B-52 aircrew and highly-placed air force commanders - none of whom would have access to the launch codes needed to conduct an actual nuclear strike - the only possible answer is that these officers were following orders. Or at least, they thought they were following legitimate orders, complete with all necessary paperwork and access codes.

The Big Question not being asked by corporate reporters afraid of losing their Pentagon and White House access is: Who gave the order to load six armed advanced nuclear cruise missiles onto a B-52?

And since Barksdale was not the bomber's original destination, but the base it was diverted to when its nuclear load-out was discovered - where was the bomber heading? And why?

"Who? Where? Why?" are the standard reporter's questions I learned at Marqeutte University's School of Journalism 40 years ago.

Where are the real journalists today?